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I.

INTRODUCTION

What type of duty, if any, should land possessors owe to honey
bees foraging on their property during pesticide applications?
Generally, land possessors have not been held liable for damage to
1
bees caused by pesticides sprayed on their own property.
However, in a significant deviation from the general rule regarding
a landowner’s duty, the Minnesota Supreme Court determined in
2
Anderson v. State Department of Natural Resources that land possessors
who have knowledge of foraging honey bees on the property owe
3
the bees a common law duty of reasonable care.
Although both honey bees and pesticides play an important
role in the agricultural economy of the United States, the two are
4
not cooperative in their efforts. The question of liability for
damages to honey bees has often been addressed in the context of
pesticides drifting from a landowner’s property to a beekeeper’s
5
property. However, the question of whether or not there should
be a duty to protect foraging bees on a land possessor’s own
6
property is a unique question and was one of first impression in
7
Minnesota.
This Case Note examines Anderson’s decision and its possible
effect on land-possessor liability to beekeepers in Minnesota and
8
other jurisdictions. First, the Case Note presents the history of
9
both pesticides and honey bees in the United States. Evaluating
the history of each subject and the effect they have upon each
other and the overall economy is crucial to understanding the
balancing acts that courts should follow when confronted with
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

See discussion infra Part IV.A.
693 N.W.2d 181 (Minn. 2005).
Id. at 187; see infra Part V.B.3.
See infra Parts II.A, III.A-B., III.C.1.
See infra Part IV.A.
See infra Part IV.A-C.
See infra Part V.B.
See infra Parts V-VII.
See infra Parts II-III.
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cases similar to Anderson.
Next, the Case Note discusses the legal history of pesticide
liability as it relates to honey bees and the evolution of such liability
10
in Minnesota and other jurisdictions. Thus far, jurisdictions have
varied extensively in the manner in which they have dealt with
11
pesticide litigation. This is due, at least partially, to the variety of
12
ways in which pesticides are both used and applied.
This Case Note then includes a detailed summary of the facts,
13
procedural history, and decision of the Anderson case. Finally, this
Case Note concludes with an analysis of the Anderson decision and
its probable implications to future litigation in this arena and, most
14
importantly, to pesticide users and beekeepers.
II. THE HISTORY OF PESTICIDES
A. The Use, Growth, and Benefits of Pesticides
All living things, including human beings, are limited in their
15
growth by the availability of life-sustaining resources. Therefore,
it is important for humans to use their natural resources
16
efficiently.
There are many ways to conduct efficient resource
17
use, but pesticide usage is one proven route for the United
18
States. Without pesticides, the United States would be unable to
find a way to maintain its plentiful food supply and relatively high
19
standard of living.
Pesticide use dates back as far as Ancient Rome, when insects
were killed by burning sulfur and weeds were controlled with salt
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

See infra Part IV.
See infra Part IV.
See discussion infra Parts III.C.1, IV.
See infra Part V.
See infra Parts VI-VII.
See KEITH S. DELAPLANE, PESTICIDE USAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: HISTORY,
BENEFITS, RISKS, AND TRENDS 1 (2000), http://pubs.caes.uga.edu/caespubs/pubs/
PDF/B1121.pdf.
16. Id.
17. Pesticides are any “substance or mixture of substances intended for:
preventing, destroying, repelling, or mitigating any pest.” U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, About Pesticides, http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/about/ (last
visited Apr. 11, 2006). “Pests are living organisms that occur where they are not
wanted or that cause damage to crops or humans or other animals.” Id. Examples
of pests include insects, mice or rats, weeds, fungi, and bacteria. Id.
18. DELAPLANE, supra note 15, at 1.
19. Id.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2006

3

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 4 [2006], Art. 5
10TRIPLETT.DOC

5/31/2006 1:15:37 PM

1492

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:4

20

concoctions. By the late nineteenth century, U.S. farmers were
21
attempting to control pests through various primitive means.
There were at least two major problems with early versions of
pesticides. The first was that the active ingredients, such as arsenic,
22
were highly toxic.
Thus, exposure through application or by
23
eating foods containing pesticide residue could be deadly.
A
second problem was that most suppliers were marketing pesticides
that did not work as promised, thus frustrating farmers who paid
24
substantial money with the hopes of having pest-free fields.
Pesticide use during the 1940s and 1950s dramatically
increased, partially due to the attention created by World War II
25
soldiers falling victim to a range of pest-borne diseases. The U.S.
Department of Agriculture (USDA) promoted the widespread
spraying of Dichloro-Diphenyl-Trichloroethane (DDT) to kill pests
carrying diseases, including mosquitoes that could transfer
26
malaria. Today, the beneficial effects of pesticides are evidenced
in developed countries by the control of tick and insect-borne
diseases, such as yellow fever, typhoid, and malaria, and the
27
sanitation of people’s homes.
The attention given to pesticides during and after World War
II resulted in scientific developments making agricultural use of
pesticides more feasible.
Today, in poor and undeveloped
countries, 95% of the population works to produce the food
supply, but in developed countries such as the United States only 3
28
to 5% of the population is involved in food production.
The
difference between the percentages is the efficiency created by

20. Id. at 2.
21. Id. Farmers were often unsuccessful in controlling pests in their crop
fields by way of copper acetoarsenite, calcium arsenate, nicotine sulfate, and
sulfur. Id.
22. See Andrew P. Morriss & Roger E. Meiners, Property Rights, Pesticides, &
Public Health: Explaining the Paradox of Modern Pesticide Policy, 14 FORDHAM ENVTL.
L.J. 1, 4-5 (2002).
23. Id. at 5.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 6-7.
26. Id. at 7-8. DDT was banned by the Environmental Protection Agency in
1972 for virtually all but emergency uses in the United States because of its
environmental persistence and food chain accumulation. U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, Terms of Environment, http://www.epa.gov/OCEPAterms/
dterms.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2006).
27. DELAPLANE, supra note 15, at 4.
28. Id.
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29

pesticide use in food production.
As of 2000, pesticides were used on approximately 900,000
30
farms and in seventy million households. One study found that
31
With
85% of U.S. homes contained at least one pesticide.
increasing populations, the need for pesticides will rise because
farmers must yield more crops on fewer acres and pest-borne
32
disease must be controlled. Scientists and lawmakers continue to
work toward pest-control plans that are both environmentally
33
sound and economically profitable.
B. The Risks and Regulation of Pesticides
During the period immediately following World War II,
34
pesticides became overused and applicators became careless.
Hand in hand with pesticide overuse came increased recognition of
35
the potential hazards they pose to human health.
“Pesticides are designed to be toxic to living things; so by their
36
very nature, they pose risks.” The main concern associated with
pesticide use is the risk it poses to human health. People can be
exposed to pesticides in one of three ways: inhalation, absorption
37
through the skin, or oral exposure. The most typical sources of
pesticide exposure are food, personal use, drinking water, or work
38
exposure. Almost all of the foods we eat have been produced with
the help of pesticides, so we may ingest residue that remains on the
39
food.
Many homeowners use pesticides to control insects or
weeds, thus coming in contact with them around their own
40
homes. Some pesticides make their way into our drinking water
41
through erosion or drift, causing us to ingest them that way.
Finally, pesticide applicators and farm workers are often exposed
29. Id.
30. Id. at 2.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 6.
33. Id.
34. Morriss & Meiners, supra note 22, at 13.
35. See id. at 14-16, 23.
36. DELAPLANE, supra note 15, at 4.
37. See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Assessing Health Risks from
Pesticides, http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/factsheets/riskassess.htm (last visited
Apr. 11, 2006).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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42

during the course of their jobs.
In addition to human health risks, there is also concern about
43
the broader environmental impact.
There is growing concern
44
that increased use of pesticides creates pesticide-resistant pests.
Resistant pests could lead back to the dangerous cycle of pesticide
overuse. There is also evidence that the majority of the pesticides
applied to crops in the United States do not even reach the
45
targeted pests. Instead, they affect non-targeted areas or animals
46
by way of drift, evaporation, run-off, or erosion.
As a result of these concerns, the federal government enacted
47
the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)
to address and reduce the adverse effects caused by pesticide
48
overuse. FIFRA prohibits the sale or distribution of any pesticide
49
not registered with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).
The EPA examines all proposed pesticides and will approve
registration only after a thorough review of their intended
50
functions and effects upon the environment. States are allowed to
regulate the sale and use of pesticides so long as they do not permit
51
any sale or use prohibited under FIFRA. States cannot impose any
pesticide labeling requirements in addition to or different from

42. Id.
43. See Tybe A. Brett & Jane E.R. Potter, Risks to Human Health Associated with
Exposure to Pesticides at the Time of Application and the Role of the Courts, 1 VILL. ENVTL.
L.J. 355, 365-68 (1990) (discussing the question of whether the benefits associated
with pesticides currently outweigh the risks).
44. Id. at 367.
45. Id. at 366.
46. Id.
47. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (2000). FIFRA was enacted in 1947. Id. § 135.
48. See Brett & Potter, supra note 43, at 358-59.
49. Id. Under FIFRA, the EPA must only register a pesticide if the following
requirements are met:
(A) its composition is such as to warrant the proposed claims for it;
(B) its labeling and other material required to be submitted comply with
the requirements of this subchapter;
(C) it will perform its intended function without unreasonable adverse
effects on the environment; and
(D) when used in accordance with widespread and commonly recognized
practice it will not generally cause unreasonable adverse effects on
the environment.
7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(5).
50. Brett & Potter, supra note 43, at 359. FIFRA defines environment as
“water, air, land, and all plants and man and other living things therein, and the
interrelationships which exist among these.” 7 U.S.C. § 136(j).
51. Brett & Potter, supra note 43, at 364.
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52

those required by FIFRA.
During the 1960s, researchers made another attempt to stop
pesticide overuse, including its effect on non-targeted plants and
animals and the increasing number of pesticide-resistant pests, by
53
developing the integrated pest management (IPM) system. IPM
aimed to use cropping methods that encouraged natural predators
to attack pests and also to time pesticide applications to coincide
54
with the most vulnerable period of a pest’s life.
IPM was not
intended as a substitute for pesticides, but only as a supplement to
55
improve their effectiveness and reduce their overall use.
To further regulate pesticide use, the EPA determined
“maximum allowable [pesticide] residue levels called ‘tolerances’
56
for thousands of crop and pesticide combinations.” A pesticide is
only permitted for use on food crops if a tolerance level has been
57
established.
The EPA also conducts evaluations to determine
whether a specific pesticide poses “unreasonable environmental
58
risks.” It is clear that although real risks exist with pesticide usage,
researchers and government agencies are working to make sure
that the risks do not outweigh the benefits.
C. Balancing the Risks and Benefits of Pesticides
Societal changes have made it impossible to return to
agricultural practices that existed prior to pesticides. There are
59
shortages of farm workers because of urban migration. The pay
rate for laborers has increased, making pesticides more cost60
effective.
Additionally, most shoppers do not buy fruits or

52. Id.
53. DELAPLANE, supra note 15, at 3.
54. Id. IPM involves the use of other techniques for pest management in
agriculture, including crop rotations, mechanical cultivation, timed plantings, pest
traps or barriers, and the use of selective herbicides. John Carlucci, Reforming the
Law on Pesticides, 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 189, 211 (1994).
55. DELAPLANE, supra note 15, at 3.
56. Id. at 5.
57. Id. at 5-6.
58. Id. at 6.
59. See LEONARD P. GIANESSI & SUJATHA SANLUKA, NAT’L CTR. FOR FOOD &
AGRIC. POLICY, THE VALUE OF HERBICIDES IN U.S. CROP PRODUCTION 58 (2003),
http://www.ncfap.org/reports/Herbicides/FullText.pdf (summarizing studies
conducted by NCFAP in April 2003 concerning the effect of non-use of pesticides
on American farms).
60. Id.
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vegetables with blemishes from plant disease or insects. Because
62
of this, most farmers must use pesticides to remain competitive.
Many opponents of pesticide use are also advocates of
alternative methods, such as organic farming, which relies solely
63
upon natural fertilizers and pest control agents. Cost increases
associated with these alternatives, including increased labor for
hand-weeding and application and income reduction, however,
make it unlikely that farmers could maintain current crop yields
64
without the use of pesticides.
A 2003 study conducted by the
National Center for Food and Agriculture Policy (NCFAP) to
determine the effects of pesticide nonuse showed dramatic declines
in production and income, while simultaneously showing increases
65
in weed control and labor costs.
It is probably easiest to see the true benefits of pesticides by
looking at the risks posed by discontinuing their use. A ban on
pesticide use would undoubtedly cause a decrease in food
production and raise prices, making U.S. farmers less competitive
66
in the global market. A ban on pesticides would likely create the
need for an increase in farmed acres to make up for reduced yields
67
per acre, thus causing a loss of wildlife habitats. In addition, the
more frequent cultivation of fields for weed control could cause
68
erosion leading to soil loss. Even our health could be adversely
affected, because a lower production of fruits and vegetables means
69
less consumption of those healthy foods.
Another way to view the benefits of pesticides is through
specific examples. One such example concerns the decline of the
70
native lake trout population in the Great Lakes. Sea lampreys,
which are native to the Atlantic Ocean, began invading the Great
61. Id. at 3.
62. Id.
63. See Brett & Potter, supra note 43, at 367-68.
64. GIANESSI & SANLUKA, supra note 59, at 57.
65. NAT’L CTR. FOR FOOD & AGRIC. POLICY, HERBICIDE NONUSE: TOP TEN STATES
BY IMPACT (2003), http://www.ncfap.org/reports/Herbicides/TopTen.pdf. The
NCFAP’s study showed that discontinuing use of pesticides would create a 13.5
billion pound production loss and $937 million reduced income in Minnesota. Id.
In addition, the study showed that nonuse of pesticides would also increase
Minnesota’s weed control costs by $449 million and labor by 506,000. Id.
66. DELAPLANE, supra note 15, at 3.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See GREAT LAKES FISHERIES COMM’N, SEA LAMPREY: A GREAT LAKES INVADER 1
(2000), http://www.glfc.org/pubs/FACT_3.pdf.
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71

Lakes during the mid-1800s. Sea lampreys caused the decimation
72
of lake trout in the Great Lakes during the 1940s and 1950s.
During the 1950s, the Great Lakes Fishery Commission (GLFC)
discovered that TFM, a pesticide, could effectively control sea
lampreys while remaining essentially harmless to other lake
73
species.
TFM now has a “40-year track record of success” in
74
controlling the lamprey population in the Great Lakes. This is
just one example of a pesticide as an environmentally beneficial
agent.
In summary, pesticide use continues because the benefits
outweigh the risks, especially since the implementation of IPM and
other strategies that make pesticides effective, yet used less
extensively.
III. THE HISTORY OF HONEY BEES
A. Beekeeping in the United States
75

The first honey
Bees are not endemic to North America.
bees were sent to America in 1623 after a failing apple orchard
prompted settlers to recall the bees in European orchards and
76
request that some be sent over. Until the 1800s, beekeeping was
primitive, although widely recognized as a valuable practice for the
77
production of honey and beeswax. Although they are normally
78
considered ferae naturae, because of their economic value courts
have held since the 1800s that a qualified property interest may be
79
acquired in bees if they can be reduced to possession.
71.
72.
73.

Id.
Id.
GREAT LAKES FISHERY COMM’N, TFM AND SEA LAMPREY CONTROL: A SUCCESS
STORY 1 (2000), http://www.glfc.org/pubs/FACT_4.pdf.
74. Id. In fact, TFM has reduced the sea lamprey population in the Great
Lakes by approximately ninety percent. Id.
75. See TAMMY HORN, BEES IN AMERICA: HOW THE HONEY BEE SHAPED A NATION
24 (2005).
76. Id.
77. See id. at 25-64 (detailing the various types of beekeeping practices that
existed in early American colonies).
78. A ferae naturae is a wild animal. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 653 (8th ed.
2004).
79. M.H.B., Annotation, Law of Bees, 39 A.L.R. 352, 353 (2005). A qualified
property interest refers to a temporary interest in a thing that is subject to being
terminated by the occurrence of an event over which the qualified owner has no
control. BLACK’S, supra note 78, at 1254.
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In 1851, Lorenzo Langstroth constructed a beehive with
moveable frames so that beekeepers could remove one frame filled
80
with honey and replace it with a new one for bees to build upon.
He also imported the Italian bee, which is the variety of honey bee
81
Thus began the
most common in the United States today.
commercial beekeeping industry.
82
Migratory commercial beekeeping became possible during
83
the 1870s, when previously closed trade routes were reestablished.
The commercial beekeeping industry developed right alongside
84
the transportation industry.
B. Pollination in Agriculture
Prior to World War II, bees were used primarily for beeswax
and honey, but after the war, the federal government began to
85
recognize the important role of honey bees as pollinators. Just as
pollination was growing as a business, the prices of honey dropped,
and beekeepers found that migratory beekeeping was the most
86
profitable way to remain in the industry.
During the 1970s, Dr. Willard Robinson brought increased
attention to the value of honey bee pollination through research
87
concerning Red Delicious apples. Dr. Robinson found that the
blossom structure on Red Delicious trees actually prevented honey
88
bees from pollinating them. However, Dr. Robinson discovered
80. HORN, supra note 75, at 86.
81. Id.
82. Migratory beekeeping is the practice of moving bees from location to
location for honey crops and pollination. BeeCare, Honeybee Encyclopedia,
http://www.beecare.com (last visited Apr. 11, 2006) (follow “Encyclopedia”
hyperlink, then follow “M” hyperlink).
83. HORN, supra note 75, at 126-27.
84. Id. at 148. Migratory beekeeping was first made possible via commercial
train routes. Id. at 145. However, with the invention of the automobile, the
transportation of domesticated honey bees for commercial purposes was made
even easier. Id. at 149.
85. Id. at 200. America’s emergence as a major world power and supplier of
food created the government’s increased recognition of the importance of crop
pollination by honey bees. Id. Pollination is the transfer of pollen from one plant
to another for fertilization. American Beekeeping Federation, Honey Bee
Pollination Crisis: Shortage of Bees May Reduce Crop Production,
http://abfnet.org/?p=51 (last visited Apr. 11, 2006).
86. HORN, supra note 75, at 206.
87. See id. at 221-22.
88. Id. This unique blossom structure of Red Delicious apple trees probably
contributed to the brand not being as productive in the past, even though it had
been developed in 1872. Id.
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that farmers could plant crab apples, which are known crosspollinators, in the Red Delicious orchards, and then place more
89
beehives to ensure adequate pollination of the crab apple trees.
His study demonstrated the importance of understanding the
complex role of pollination in agriculture.
Today, approximately 1600 beekeepers manage commercial
90
colonies in the United States.
Providing honey bees for crop
pollination is the easiest and most reliable service in planned
91
pollination. More than 3.5 million crop acres in the United States
92
depend upon honey bee pollination. It is estimated that more
than 100 crops are pollinated by bees, and about one-third of the
93
food that Americans eat comes directly from those crops. As of
1997, the estimated value added to United States crops by honey
94
bees was $10 billion.
C. Problems for Commercial Beekeepers
1.

Pesticides

Beginning with the take-off of migratory beekeeping in the
1950s, beekeepers were usually the last to know about pesticide
application schedules and so incurred many losses in their
95
Extensive bee kills during the latter 1960s were
colonies.
responsible for many commercial beekeepers going out of
96
business.
As of the mid-1990s, bee poisonings from pesticides
89. Id.
90. American Beekeeping Federation, supra note 85.
Commercial
beekeepers are defined by the American Beekeeping Federation as “those
beekeepers who manage more than 300 colonies of bees.” Id.
91. MID-ATLANTIC APICULTURAL RESEARCH & EXTENSION CONSORTIUM,
POLLINATION, PUB. 5.2 (2000), http://maarec.cas.psu.edu/PDFs/Pollination_
PM.pdf [hereinafter MAAREC].
92. Id.
93. MID-ATLANTIC APICULTURAL RESEARCH & EXTENSION CONSORTIUM, BEES
ARE BENEFICIAL, PUB. 1.1 (2000), http://maarec.cas.psu.edu/PDFs/Bees_are_
Beneficial_-_PM.pdf.
94. Dennis Senft, Helping Honey Bees Fight Mites, AGRIC. RES., May 1997,
available at http://www.beesource.com/news/article/beecells0597.htm. A variety
of well-known crops are pollinated by bees, including clover, apples, apricots, kiwi,
cherries, peaches, almonds, cashews, cotton, sunflower, broccoli, celery, onions,
beans, and peppers. This list is far from exhaustive. MAAREC, supra note 91.
95. HORN, supra note 75, at 207. Because the chemicals had little or no effect
upon other farmers’ livestock or crops, the beekeepers did not have much
recourse for the losses they suffered. Id.
96. Id. at 214-15. In Arizona alone, honey bee populations declined almost
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resulted in annual losses in crop revenue of $14.3 million.
The EPA has designated Carbaryl as “one of the most widely
98
applied [pesticides] in the U.S.,” which is most likely the reason
99
for it being regarded as one of the most dangerous pesticides. It
is highly toxic and has killed more bees in California than any
100
other pesticide.
2.

Mites

Pesticides are not the only hindrance to commercial
beekeepers. The varroa mite, the most troublesome mite to honey
bees, first migrated from Asia to the United States in 1987 and
101
wiped out thousands of bee colonies. The varroa mite is a honey
bee parasite that infests colonies and can destroy an entire colony
102
The American Beekeeping Federation
in a matter of months.
estimated that 50% of California bee colonies have been killed or
103
severely weakened due to the parasitic varroa mites.
One
entomologist estimated that commercial beekeepers nationwide
104
have lost about half of their hives as a result of mite infestations.
D. Honey Bees in Minnesota
Minnesota ranks among the top five states for honey
production and is currently a base for more than fifty migratory
105
The Minnesota Department of Agriculture (MDA)
beekeepers.
50% between 1963 and 1977. Id. at 215.
97. North American Pollinator Protection Campaign, Pollinators,
http://www.nappc.org/pollinator.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2006).
98. Beyond
Pesticides,
Chemical
Watch
Factsheet:
Carbaryl,
http://www.beyondpesticides.org/pesticides/factsheets/Carbaryl.pdf (last visited
Apr. 11, 2006). Carbaryl use began in 1959 and according to the EPA,
approximately ten to fifteen million pounds are used annually. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. HORN, supra note 75, at 228.
102. Alfredo Flores, Saving Bees: Fungus Found to Attack Varroa Mites, AGRIC.
RES., Oct. 2004, available at http://beesource.com/news/article/fungus.htm. The
varroa mite reproduces on worker bees and creates year-long hive susceptibility, as
opposed to only seasonal inflictions. HORN, supra note 75, at 228. In the 1980s,
the mite caused such destruction in the beekeeping industry that many states
imposed quarantines upon beekeepers. Id.
103. American Beekeeping Federation, supra note 85.
104. Senft, supra note 94.
105. See MINN. DEP’T OF AGRIC., APIARY PROGRAM REPORT 1 (2004),
http://www.mda.state.mn.us/apiary/04apiaryreport.pdf.
Minnesota honey
production is valued at approximately $12 million annually. Id.
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106

requires all beekeepers to register their colonies.
MDA records
show that there are 421 registered Minnesota beekeepers managing
107
more than 120,000 colonies.
Approximately 86% of those
colonies are kept by migratory beekeepers who make their living in
108
the commercial beekeeping industry. Colony registration is used
by the MDA to inspect hives regularly and is available to pesticide
109
applicators upon request.
The number of pesticide-related complaints from Minnesota
110
beekeepers has been steadily increasing since 1996.
From 1996
to 2000, the MDA received twelve complaints regarding alleged
111
pesticide-related bee kills. Only two were found to have sufficient
evidence to support a pesticide-related bee kill due to negligent
112
application by someone other than the beekeepers. In 2001, the
MDA received eight complaints, of which seven were found lacking
sufficient evidence to conclude death resulting from pesticide
113
exposure.
In 2002, the MDA received ten complaints, of which
only one was found to have sufficient evidence that a nearby
114
pesticide application caused the honey bee deaths.
MDA laboratory analysis of beekeeper complaints has yet to
find widespread detections of Sevin (Carbaryl), which was alleged
to be the primary pesticide used in most of the complaints reported
115
since 2000.
But in each case, coumaphos, a pesticide used by
116
beekeepers to control the varroa mite, was detected in the hives.
106. MINN. STAT. § 19.64, subd. 1 (2004). The law regarding registration
applies to anyone who “owns, leases, or possesses colonies of bees.” Id. The
maximum annual registration fee is only fifty dollars. Id.
107. See MINN. DEP’T OF AGRIC., supra note 105, at 1.
108. See id. The remainder of the colonies are managed either by sideline
beekeepers, who keep eleven to 799 colonies, or hobbyists, who keep ten or fewer
colonies. Id.
109. Minnesota
Department
of
Agriculture,
Apiary
Program,
http://www.mda.state.mn.us/apiary (last visited Mar. 12, 2006).
110. See MINN. DEP’T OF AGRIC., HONEYBEE COMPLAINT INVESTIGATIONS FACT
SHEET 1 (2003), http://www.mda.state.mn.us/appd/pesticides/
beescomplaints.pdf.
111. Id.
112. Id. Three of the investigations resulted in financial penalties issued to the
beekeepers themselves for illegal pesticide use in their own hives. Id.
113. Id. The remaining investigation determined that an insecticide was the
likely cause of death of the bees, but could not locate an applicator or an
appropriate site for the type of insecticide found. Id.
114. Id. at 2. Again, one complaint was dismissed after the discovery of illegal
pesticide use by the beekeeper to control honey bee pests. Id.
115. Id. at 1.
116. Id. at 2.
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As a result of these investigations, and with the cooperation of all
interested parties, the MDA has published a set of “bestmanagement practices,” which suggests strategies for beekeepers,
pesticide users, and the MDA in an attempt to address bee
117
mortality problems and make future investigations easier.
IV. A LEGAL HISTORY OF PESTICIDE ACTIONS
A. Common Law Negligence
A landowner has an obligation to make reasonable use of his
or her property so that no unreasonable harm is caused to others
118
This “reasonable use” rule is followed in
in the vicinity.
119
Minnesota.
Through application of this rule, landowners have
117. Id. The seven step best-management practices are as follows:
(1) Frequent inspection by beekeepers of their colonies to allow timely
reporting to the MDA of alleged bee kills . . . .
(2) Apiarists should minimize their own use of insecticides . . . inside
hives to control bee pests. . . .
(3) Those using insecticides in areas of high apiary concentrations
should use the least toxic insecticide necessary to control a particular
pest.
(4) Pesticide applicators should determine bee hive locations . . . in the
vicinity of proposed spray operations prior to making any
application. . . .
(5) Hybrid poplar growers should implement integrated weed control
strategies to reduce the presence of blooming weeds . . . .
(6) The University of Minnesota . . . should research effective
cottonwood leaf beetle control strategies that pose minimal risk to
honeybees and other non-target organisms.
(7) MDA staff, apiarists and others should periodically review and offer
proposed improvements to MDA’s inspection protocols and
procedures related to investigations of reported honeybee problems.
Id.
118. See Brett & Potter, supra note 43, at 380 (stating that a landowner’s
common law privilege is qualified by the rights of neighbors to be safe from
unreasonable harm on their own land). See generally 2 C.J.S. Adjoining Landowners
§ 68 (2005) (stating that a landowner’s privilege to use land is “qualified by due
regard for others who may be affected by a landowner’s activities on the
property”).
119. See Depue v. Flateau, 100 Minn. 299, 303, 111 N.W. 1, 2 (1907).
[W]henever a person is placed in such a position with regard to another
that it is obvious that, if he does not use due care in his own conduct, he
will cause injury to that person, the duty at once arises to exercise care
commensurate with the situation in which he thus finds himself, and with
which he is confronted, to avoid such danger; and a negligent failure to
perform the duty renders him liable for the consequences of his neglect.
This principle . . . protects the trespasser from wanton or willful injury.
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not generally been held liable for damage to bees or other
120
121
animals caused by pesticides sprayed on their own property. In
Minnesota, a landowner only has a duty to trespassing animals if
and when they are discovered on the land, and then only to use
122
reasonable care to avoid injuring them. An animal’s owner is
entitled to recover for a wrongful injury to an animal resulting
123
from a willful act.
It is not uncommon for landowners to be held responsible for
damage caused to property, plants, or animals when pesticides drift
124
onto others’ land during or after their application.
This is a
regular occurrence in agriculture, sparking many “pesticide drift”
125
cases.
The most common standard of liability for damage caused to
neighboring landowners’ animals from pesticide use is
126
127
negligence.
In order to succeed in a negligence
claim
Id.
120. See discussion supra Part III.A. (noting that bees are comparable to
domesticated animals once they are reduced to a person’s possession).
121. See generally J.P. Ludington, Annotation, Liability for Injury to Trespassing
Stock from Poisonous Substances on the Premises, 12 A.L.R. 3D 1103 (2005) (discussing
various cases in which landowners have not been held liable for the poisoning of
animals who traveled onto their property).
122. See Lindemann v. Chi., R.I. & P. Ry. Co., 154 Minn. 363, 365, 191 N.W.
825, 825-26 (1923) (holding that liability pertaining to trespassing animals could
only be maintained upon a showing of willful or wanton negligence); Witherell v.
Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 24 Minn. 410, 414 (1878) (holding that the owner of
an animal who wanders onto railroad tracks incurs all reasonable risks for the
animal being injured by a train, but once discovered, the train operator must use
reasonable care to avoid injuring them).
123. See 3B C.J.S. Animals § 426 (2004) (stating that landowners are not liable
when trespassing animals ingest poison placed on the landowner’s property for
some other purpose, absent wanton or gross negligence). Gross negligence is “a
conscious, voluntary act or omission in reckless disregard of a legal duty” which
leads to consequences suffered by a third party. BLACK’ S, supra note 78, at 1062.
124. See generally Jonathan M. Purver, Annotation, Liability for Injury Caused by
Spraying or Dusting of Crops, 37 A.L.R. 3D 833 (2005) (discussing the facts of various
cases concerning liability of landowners and crop dusters for damages to property
resulting during pesticide spray applications).
125. See, e.g., Lundberg v. Bolon, 194 P.2d 454 (Ariz. 1948); Hammond Ranch
Corp. v. Dodson, 136 S.W.2d 484 (Ark. 1940); Miles v. A. Arena & Co., 73 P.2d
1260 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1937); Ky. Aerospray, Inc. v. Mays, 251 S.W.2d 460 (Ky.
1952); D & W Jones, Inc. v. Collier, 372 So. 2d 288 (Miss. 1979); Mustion v. Ealy,
266 N.W.2d 730 (Neb. 1978); McPherson v. Billington, 399 S.W.2d 186 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1965).
126. Brett & Potter, supra note 43, at 381.
127. Negligence is defined as
[t]he failure to exercise the standard of care that a reasonably prudent
person would have exercised in a similar situation; any conduct that falls
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concerning pesticide use, a plaintiff must prove that the negligent
application of pesticides on neighboring land was the cause of his
128
or her crop or animal damages.
A typical case concerning liability for negligence is Miles v. A.
129
In Miles, the plaintiff sought damages for the
Arena & Co.
destruction of fifty-six beehives allegedly killed by drifting pesticide
130
dust from the defendant’s land. The plaintiff’s bees were located
131
The Miles court
on rented property near the defendant’s farm.
relied upon the rule that no landowner has the right to use his
132
property in such a way that damage to a neighbor is foreseeable.
The court went on to hold that because of the evidence presented
concerning the conditions at the time of the pesticide spraying, the
defendants should have foreseen the damage to plaintiff’s bees and
133
were liable for damages.
California is one jurisdiction that has addressed the unique
issue of liability for damage to foraging bees, as opposed to bees on
134
their own land. The issue was considered in Lenk v. Spezia, in
which the court held that landowners were not liable to foraging
135
bees based upon the decision that the bees were trespassers. The
California District Court of Appeal held that an injured party could
only recover for damages to bees if the pesticide was sprayed with
the intention to destroy the bees and not for some other lawful

below the legal standard established [by case law] to protect others
against unreasonable risk of harm, except for conduct that is
intentionally, wantonly, or willfully disregardful of others’ rights.
BLACK’S , supra note 78, at 1061.
128. Brett & Potter, supra note 43, at 381. A negligence claim must be
grounded by four elements: duty, breach of duty, causation, and damages.
BLACK’S, supra note 78, at 1062.
129. 73 P.2d 1260 (Cal. 1937).
130. Id. at 1261.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1262. The Miles court relied upon the Restatement (First) of Torts,
which states that a land possessor may be held liable for injury caused by an
artificial condition on his land which creates an “unreasonable risk of bodily harm
to persons outside the land because of [its] plan, construction, location or
otherwise.” RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 364 cmt. a (1934).
133. Miles, 73 P.2d at 1263. The conditions referred to by the court were the
facts that a substance known to be poisonous to bees was being used and at the
time of the application a breeze was blowing. Id.
134. 213 P.2d 47 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1949).
135. Id. at 51 (holding that the owner of bees cannot recover for their death
from poisons procured while trespassing on another’s land “unless the poison was
distributed wantonly, maliciously, or with the deliberate intent to injure or destroy
the bees”).
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136

purpose.
This common law negligence decision was based
primarily upon the generally accepted rule that a landowner is not
137
bound to keep the premises safe for others’ trespassing animals.
B. Strict Liability
A few jurisdictions have found that the application of
138
139
In Loe v. Lenhardt, the
pesticides is an ultrahazardous activity.
Oregon Supreme Court stated that “[t]he authorities are practically
uniform in holding that crop dusting is an activity sufficiently
freighted with danger to impose liability upon the landowner
having the work done if negligence is proven,” even if there is no
140
fault, or if the fault lies entirely with an independent contractor.
Courts have recognized liability for pesticide use as an
ultrahazardous activity for various reasons.
Some cite the
foreseeability of the pesticide to drift onto neighboring
141
properties.
Others base their classification solely upon the
142
intrinsically dangerous characteristics of pesticides.
Regardless,
136. Id.
137. Id. The Lenk court stated that the defendants had no affirmative duty to
protect the plaintiff’s trespassing bees from the danger of poison on the land. Id.
(citing Jeanes v. Holtz, 211 P.2d 925 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1949); Holt v. Mundell,
112 P.2d 1039, 1043 (Colo. 1941)); see also Ludington, supra note 121.
138. An ultrahazardous (abnormally dangerous) activity is one which
“necessarily carries with it a significant risk of serious harm even if reasonable care
is used.” BLACK’S, supra note 78, at 5. To determine whether an activity is
ultrahazardous, one must analyze
whether there is a high degree of risk of harm, whether any harm caused
will be substantial, whether the exercise of reasonable care will eliminate
the risk, whether the activity is a matter of common usage, whether the
activity is appropriate to the place in which it occurs, and whether the
activity’s value to society outweighs its dangerousness.
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977)).
139. 362 P.2d 312 (Or. 1961).
140. Id. at 315. The Loe court further discussed the notion that traditional
practice requires the court, when determining whether an activity is
ultrahazardous or not, to evaluate and balance the utility of the activity against the
risk of harm it may cause if miscarried. Id. at 316.
141. See, e.g., Copeland v. Hollingsworth, 535 S.W.2d 815, 816 (Ark. 1976)
(holding that because of the great probability of pesticide sprays to spread to
nearby property and cause damage, a landowner could not delegate liability for
the activity to the independent contractor employed to spray the pesticide).
142. See, e.g., Pendergrass v. Lovelace, 262 P.2d 231, 232 (N.M. 1953) (stating
that the test for liability hinged upon whether danger is inherent in the
performance of an activity and finding that “depositing an insecticide, consisting
of a poisonous dust or spray, on a field” is an example of such an inherently
dangerous activity) (quoting 57 C.J.S. Master and Servant §§ 590(b), 591(a)).
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143

in jurisdictions where strict liability applies to pesticide damages,
courts do not ask whether the defendant acted with due care, but
144
only whether the defendant’s actions caused the damage.
A classic strict liability application can be seen in Winston v.
145
State Department of Highways, in which the plaintiff sued to recover
damages for the deaths of four bulls, allegedly as the result of their
ingesting arsenic sprayed by the defendant while constructing a
146
concrete underpass. The Winston court based its ruling upon the
idea that a person cannot use his land in a way that will cause
147
damage to his neighbors.
The court held that regardless of
whether or not the defendant used due care in conducting the
arsenic spraying, it caused the death of the plaintiff’s bulls and he
148
should be held strictly liable.
C. Negligence Per Se
Negligence per se arises not from a common law duty
149
In
stemming from case law decisions, but from a statutory duty.
other words, the reasonable person standard of care is replaced by
150
Because all pesticide applicators are
a statutory standard.
required to comply with FIFRA label instructions, many
jurisdictions find it to be contrary to legislative intent to apply
151
common law negligence theories to pesticide cases.
Wisconsin is another jurisdiction that has considered the issue

143. Strict liability “does not depend on actual negligence or intent to harm,
but . . . is based on the breach of an absolute duty to make something safe.”
BLACK’S, supra note 78, at 934. Ultrahazardous activities form one category of cases
in which strict liability applies. Id.
144. Brett & Potter, supra note 43, at 392.
145. 352 So. 2d 752 (La. Ct. App. 1977).
146. Id. at 752.
147. Id. at 755. “Although a proprietor may do with his estate whatever he
pleases, still he can not [sic] make any work on it, which may deprive his neighbor
of the liberty of enjoying his own, or which may be the cause of any damage to
him.” Id. (quoting LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 667 (1977)).
148. Id.
149. BLACK’S, supra note 78, at 1063.
150. Elder v. Allstate Ins. Co., 341 F. Supp. 2d 1095, 1099 (D. Minn. 2004)
(citing Seim v. Garavalia, 306 N.W.2d 806, 810 (Minn. 1981)).
151. See, e.g., Henderson v. Dep’t of Agric., 875 P.2d 487 (Or. Ct. App. 1994);
Ward v. N.E. Tex. Farmers Coop. Elevator, 909 S.W.2d 143 (Tex. App. 1995);
Bennett v. Larsen Co., 348 N.W.2d 540 (Wis. 1984); see also Robert F. Blomquist,
Applying Pesticides: Toward Reconceptualizing Liability to Neighbors for Crop, Livestock
and Personal Damages from Agricultural Chemical Drift, 48 OKLA. L. REV. 393, 394-97
(1995).
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of liability for pesticide damage to foraging bees. In Bennett v.
152
Larsen Co., the Wisconsin Supreme Court first decided that it was
153
erroneous to classify honey bees as trespassers. That decision was
based upon the idea that a trespass has traditionally been held as
154
Thus, the court found it unreasonable to
an uninvited entry.
place honey bees in the same category as common trespassers
because it would be almost impossible to keep bees off one’s
155
property if they are intent upon foraging there.
The Bennett court then held that, in the absence of willful or
wanton conduct, land possessors who follow pesticide label
directions have no duty to foraging bees on their property, because
156
they have the right to use their land as they see fit.
The court
also expressly noted that the absence of a common law duty to
honey bees did not preclude duties that may be imposed by
statutes, which can modify the common law and create negligence
157
per se liability.
Finally, the court held that, in light of a
Wisconsin statute establishing a standard of care via pesticide label
instructions, the failure to follow such instructions constituted
158
negligence per se.
“[B]reach of a statute gives rise to negligence per se if the
persons harmed . . . are within the intended protection of the
statute and the harm suffered is of the type the legislation was
159
intended to prevent.” States, like Wisconsin, have usually enacted
statutes prohibiting the use of pesticides in a manner inconsistent
with FIFRA labels, which contain warnings such as “[d]o not apply
160
while bees are actively foraging.” Thus, like in Bennett, most states
152. 348 N.W.2d 540 (Wis. 1984).
153. Id. at 547 n.3.
154. Id. The court reasoned that if there is no way for a landowner to prevent
a trespasser’s entry, the trespasser status becomes “meaningless insofar as it relates
to the rights and duties” of the landowner. Id. A trespass is a “wrongful entry on
another’s real property.” BLACK’S, supra note 78, at 1541.
155. Bennett, 348 N.W.2d at 547 n.3.
156. Id. at 550.
157. Id. at 548-50.
158. Id. at 549.
159. Alderman’s, Inc. v. Shanks, 536 N.W.2d 4, 8 (Minn. 1995) (citing Pac.
Indem. Co. v. Thompson-Yaeger, Inc., 260 N.W.2d 548, 558-559 (Minn. 1977)).
Breach of the statute is conclusive evidence of negligence per se because the
statute imposes a fixed standard of care, as opposed to the reasonable standard
imposed under ordinary negligence. Id.
160. TRACY E. OUTLAW, CLEMSON UNIV. DEP’T OF PESTICIDE REGULATION, HOW
1 (Cam Lay ed., 2006),
TO PROTECT HONEYBEES FROM PESTICIDES
http://dpr.clemson.edu/Acrobat/bulletin-5.pdf.
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are able to assign liability for pesticide damages based upon the
theory of negligence per se if the plaintiff can prove that the
defendant was not following a FIFRA label and had therefore
violated a state statute.
V. THE ANDERSON CASE
A. Facts
Jeffrey Anderson and the other plaintiffs in Anderson v. State
Department of Natural Resources were migratory commercial
161
beekeepers with hives located in several Minnesota counties. The
plaintiffs had permission from several landowners to use the
landowners’ property for beekeeping in exchange for honey or
162
small amounts of money.
The land upon which the beehives
were located was adjacent to a poplar tree grove owned and
managed by the defendants in the case: the State of Minnesota
Department of Natural Resources (DNR) and International Paper
163
Company (IP).
The defendants used the property for paper
164
production and fuel research.
Plaintiffs’ honey bees, which
forage by nature, traveled “a radius of three to five miles,
165
pollinating crops and plants in central Minnesota.”
In response to a cottonwood leaf beetle infestation in 1997 and
1998, the defendants retained a commercial spray operator to
®
apply the pesticide Sevin XLR Plus (Sevin) to their poplar
166
groves. Sevin, which is one of the most commonly used pesticides
167
168
in the United States, is also highly toxic to bees.
161. 693 N.W.2d 181, 185 (Minn. 2005).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Anderson v. State Dep’t of Natural Res., 674 N.W.2d 748, 751 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2004), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 693 N.W.2d 181 (Minn. 2005).
166. Anderson, 693 N.W.2d at 185.
167. BEYOND PESTICIDES, CHEMICAL WATCH FACTSHEET: CARBARYL 1 (2001),
http://www.beyondpesticides.org/pesticides/factsheets/Carbaryl.pdf. Sevin is the
brand name for the generic Carbaryl. Id.
168. Id. at 2; see also Anderson, 674 N.W.2d at 752 (stating that foraging bees
can carry poisoned pollen back to the hive, where it can stay active for up to a
year); Letter from Shawnee Hoover, Special Projects Director, Beyond Pesticides,
to the Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Pesticide Programs (Nov. 16,
2004), available at http://www.beyondpesticides.org/watchdog/comments/
Carbaryl%20beyond%20pesticides%2012_04.pdf (containing a compilation of
comments from U.S. beekeepers, beekeeping associations, public interest groups,
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Sevin’s label explicitly instructs users not to apply the pesticide
169
if bees are foraging in the area. The beekeepers alleged that the
DNR and IP knew of foraging bees on their property when they
170
directed the pesticide spraying.
During one occasion in 1999,
referred to by the parties as the “Swanson incident,” one of the
landowners estimated that Sevin was sprayed approximately 100
171
feet from several of the beekeepers’ hives.
The Minnesota
Department of Agriculture (MDA) lab confirmed that at least some
of the bees found after the “Swanson incident” had died as a result
172
of Sevin poisoning.
The DNR now has a policy, which was
implemented in 2001, not to use Sevin on any of its groves without
173
first notifying registered beekeepers.
B. Procedure
1.

The Douglas County District Court

The beekeepers brought suit against the DNR and IP, alleging
three causes of action. First, they asserted that the defendants
174
negligently created an unreasonable risk of harm to their bees.
Second, the plaintiffs argued that the defendants were negligent
per se by using pesticides in a manner inconsistent with a label as

and academic supporters to the Environmental Protection Agency concerning the
bee caution contained on Carbaryl pesticides).
169. BAYER CROPSCIENCE, SEVIN® BRAND XLR PLUS CARBARYL INSECTICIDE 2
(2004), available at http://bayercropscienceus.com (follow “Labels/MSDS”
hyperlink; then follow “Specimen Label (Section 3)” hyperlink under “Sevin® XLR
Plus” heading). The bee caution on Sevin’s label reads:
This product is highly toxic to bees exposed to direct treatment or
residues on blooming crops or weeds. However, field studies have shown
that SEVIN® brand . . . is less hazardous to honey bees than other
carbaryl products when direct application to bees is avoided and the
spray residues have dried. For maximum honey bee hazard reduction,
apply from late evening to early morning or when bees are not foraging.
Do not apply this product or allow it to drift to blooming crops or weeds if bees are
foraging in the treatment area. However, applications may be made during
foraging periods if the beekeeper takes . . . precautionary measures prior
to bee flight activity on the day of treatment . . . .
Id. (emphasis added).
170. Anderson, 693 N.W.2d at 185.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Anderson, 674 N.W.2d at 752.
174. Anderson, 693 N.W.2d at 185.
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175

defined in the Minnesota Pesticide Control Act (MPCA). Finally,
the beekeepers alleged that the DNR and IP had created a private
176
nuisance. The DNR and IP filed motions for summary judgment
177
The district court granted summary judgment for
on all claims.
the DNR and IP on all claims with the exception of a portion of the
negligence claim related to the “Swanson incident,” which had
been confirmed by the MDA lab and held by the court to be
178
indicative of intentional and wanton conduct.
2.

The Minnesota Court of Appeals

The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the denial of
summary judgment for the negligence claims relating to the
179
The court held that because the DNR had
“Swanson incident.”
hired an independent contractor to spray near the hives in the
“Swanson incident,” the DNR could not be held vicariously liable
180
for any resulting injury to the bees. The court discussed the fact
that other states had found pesticide spraying to be so dangerous
that landowners who hire independent contractors to do the
181
spraying could not avoid liability.
However, because the parties
did not present evidence regarding whether or not spraying
182
pesticides constitutes an ultrahazardous activity,
the court
183
that—absent an
declined to change the general rule
ultrahazardous activity—an employer is not liable for harm caused
184
by an act of a general contractor.
175. Id. The Minnesota Pesticide Control Act is codified at Minnesota Statutes
section 18B.07.
176. Anderson, 693 N.W.2d at 185.
177. Id. at 185-86.
178. Id. at 186.
179. Anderson v. State Dep’t of Natural Res., 674 N.W.2d 748, 759 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2004), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 693 N.W.2d 181 (Minn. 2005).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. The general rule is that a party is not entitled to raise a question for the
first time on appeal. See Edelstein v. Duluth, Missabe & Iron Range Ry. Co., 225
Minn. 508, 516, 31 N.W.2d 465, 470 (1948) (stating that the theory upon which a
case is tried must be adhered to on appeal); see also Morton v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 301
Minn. 405, 427, 223 N.W.2d 764, 771 (1974); Duenow v. Lindeman, 223 Minn.
505, 510, 27 N.W.2d 421, 425 (1947).
183. In Minnesota, the employer of a contractor is not liable for harm caused
by an act or omission made by the contractor. Conover v. N. States Power Co., 313
N.W.2d 397, 403 (Minn. 1981) (citing Rausch v. Julius B. Nelson & Sons, Inc., 276
Minn. 12, 149 N.W.2d 1 (1967)).
184. Anderson, 674 N.W.2d at 759. The court acknowledged that Minnesota

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol32/iss4/5

22

Triplett: Torts-Buzz Off! Expanding the Scope of a Landowner's Duty to Hone
10TRIPLETT.DOC

2006]

5/31/2006 1:15:37 PM

EXPANDING THE SCOPE OF A LANDOWNER’S DUTY

1511

The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of the nuisance
claim because the plaintiffs failed to “demonstrate an injury
185
stemming from an interest in land.”
The court held that no
186
nuisance claim exists if a party cannot show an injury to land, and
187
that bees could not be considered land.
The court of appeals also affirmed the district court’s dismissal
of the other negligence claims, in which the plaintiffs alleged that
the DNR and IP had a duty to use pesticides in a way that did not
188
create an unreasonable risk of harm to their bees.
In doing so,
the court relied upon the conclusions of the Wisconsin Supreme
189
Court in Bennett v. Larsen Co., because it was one of only two
jurisdictions in the United States to address what type of duty
190
landowners owe to bees foraging on their property. The court of
appeals found that bees were not trespassers in the traditional
sense, but that landowners nevertheless had a duty not to
191
intentionally harm bees if they were on their property. However,
the defendants were not held liable for negligence because there
192
was no evidence of intentional or wanton conduct on their part.
Finally, the court of appeals affirmed the district court’s
dismissal of the plaintiffs’ negligence per se claim, which alleged
that the DNR and IP applied the pesticide inconsistent with the bee
193
caution on Sevin’s label.
The court of appeals deferred to the
expert testimony of a MDA director, who stated that Sevin’s bee
caution should be interpreted to mean that the pesticide should
not be applied when “a significant number of blooming crops or

courts have not yet addressed whether the Second Restatement of Torts’
ultrahazardous activity exception applies to an independent contractor spraying
pesticides but have ruled that if the spraying were determined to be
ultrahazardous, then an employer would be held vicariously liable for any damage
caused by it under the non-delegable duty rule. Id. (citing Kellen v. Mathias, 519
N.W.2d 218, 221 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994)).
185. Anderson, 674 N.W.2d at 760.
186. Id. (quoting Am. Computer Trust Leasing v. Jack Farrell Implement Co.,
763 F. Supp. 1473, 1494 (D. Minn. 1991)).
187. Id.
188. Id. at 758.
189. 348 N.W.2d 540 (Wis. 1984).
190. Anderson, 674 N.W.2d at 757.
191. Id. at 757-58.
192. Id. at 758. The court of appeals found that neither IP nor the DNR
intentionally meant to harm the bees because their sole purpose in spraying the
pesticides was to stop the beetle infestation in their poplar groves and not to rid
their land of honey bees. Id.
193. Id. at 753.
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weeds are present . . . [and] a significant number of bees are actively
194
The court held that the
foraging in the treatment area.”
beekeepers had not proven that a significant number of bees were
actively foraging in the poplar groves during the pesticide
195
application, so Sevin’s label was not violated.
3.

The Minnesota Supreme Court
196

The Minnesota Supreme Court, in a four-to-two decision,
affirmed the dismissal of the private nuisance claim based upon the
197
fact that “[p]rivate nuisance is limited to real property interests.”
However, the court held that summary judgment against the
beekeepers on the negligence and negligence per se claims was
198
improper.
The supreme court first concluded that land possessors who
have knowledge of foraging honey bees on their property have a
199
duty of reasonable care not to harm the bees.
The court
reasoned that such a duty stems from the general duty of
landowners not to use their property in a way that would cause
200
injury to another’s property.
The court acknowledged that
liability had regularly been imposed upon landowners who sprayed
pesticide that then drifted onto another’s property and killed
201
bees, but that it had not yet been imposed in cases involving bees
coming in contact with pesticides while foraging on another’s
202
property. However, the court reasoned that it has long been held
that once a trespassing animal is discovered upon the property, a
landowner is “bound to use reasonable care to avoid injuring
203
[it].”
194. Id. at 754.
195. Id.
196. Justice G. Barry Anderson took no part in the consideration or decision of
this case.
197. Anderson v. State Dep’t of Natural Res., 693 N.W.2d 181, 192 (Minn.
2005).
198. Id.
199. Id. at 189 n.4.
200. Id. at 186 (citing Farrell v. Minneapolis & R.R. Ry. Co., 121 Minn. 357,
361, 141 N.W. 491, 492 (1913)).
201. Id. at 187 (citing Lundberg v. Bolon, 194 P.2d 454, 459 (Ariz. 1948);
McKennon v. Jones, 244 S.W.2d 138, 139 (Ark. 1951); Miles v. A. Arena & Co., 73
P.2d 1260, 1263 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1937)).
202. Id. (citing Lenk v. Spezia, 213 P.2d 47, 51 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1949);
Bennett v. Larsen Co., 348 N.W.2d 540, 547-48 n.3 (Wis. 1984)).
203. Id. (quoting Witherell v. Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 24 Minn. 410, 414
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The supreme court next decided that it was unnecessary to
classify the honey bees’ entry onto the defendants’ land because
the resulting duty of reasonable care was the same regardless of
204
whether or not the bees were deemed trespassers.
In addition,
the court had difficulty identifying honey bees as classic
205
trespassers because they forage in order to pollinate crops and
206
The court
their entry results in a benefit to the landowner.
therefore found that because bees and honey are important aspects
of agriculture, it would be against public policy to classify them as
207
trespassers.
The supreme court also declined to place a duty upon land
possessors to investigate their land for honey bees prior to using
208
pesticides.
Although Minnesota requires beekeepers to register
annually so that pesticide applicators can easily locate nearby
209
apiaries, the court found that it is more practical for beekeepers
themselves to provide notice to those that own land where the bees
210
may forage.
The supreme court acknowledged the extensive efforts of the
legislature to address the damaging effects of pesticides through
211
FIFRA and its preemptive effect upon state negligence claims.
However, because FIFRA only preempts claims based upon breach
of warranty, failure to warn, or the EPA’s enforcement of label
requirements, the court found that the beekeepers still had a
212
common law negligence claim against the DNR and IP.
(1878)).
204. Id. The court held that if the beekeepers’ allegation that the DNR and IP
knew about the foraging bees was correct, trespasser classification was unnecessary
because even if the bees were trespassing, the landowner still has a duty of
reasonable care once they are discovered on the land. Id.
205. A trespasser is “one who intentionally and without consent or privilege
enters another’s property.” BLACK’S, supra note 78, at 1543.
206. Anderson, 693 N.W.2d at 187 n.2.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 187 n.3.
209. MINN. STAT. § 19.64, subd. 1 (2004). “Every person who owns, leases, or
possesses colonies of bees shall register the bees with the commissioner[;] . . .
[t]he registration application shall include . . . a description of the exact location
of each of the applicant’s apiaries by county, township, range, and quarter section
. . . .” Id.
210. Anderson, 693 N.W.2d at 187 n.3.
211. Id. at 188. The preemptive effect of FIFRA is that “[a] State may regulate
the sale or use of any federally registered pesticide . . . in the State, but only if and
to the extent the regulation does not permit any sale or use prohibited by this
subchapter.” 7 U.S.C. § 136v (2000).
212. Anderson, 693 N.W.2d at 188.
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The supreme court next considered whether the plaintiffs had
presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the defendants
213
had knowledge of the honey bees on their property.
Primarily
based upon documents presented by the beekeepers from a 2000
meeting where IP and the DNR were informed of the bees’
presence and the negative impact of Sevin, the court held that
214
summary judgment against the plaintiffs was improper.
The
court also determined that the plaintiffs should be allowed to
continue with their negligence claim based upon the “Swanson
incident” because the DNR had retained control over the
contractor doing the spraying and thus could be found negligent
215
for that incident as well.
Finally, the supreme court reviewed the negligence per se
216
The statutory
claim in relation to a violation of Sevin’s label.
217
violation alleged by the plaintiffs was the MPCA, which prohibits
the use of pesticides in a manner that is “inconsistent with a label
218
Unlike the court of appeals,
or labeling as defined by FIFRA.”
the supreme court concluded that the MDA expert’s testimony was
not entitled to deference because the expert was not an agency
decision-maker and was obtained solely for the purpose of
219
litigation.
In addition, the court found that conflicting expert
testimony on behalf of both parties created genuine issues of
material fact, thus precluding summary judgment against the
220
beekeepers.
4.

The Minnesota Supreme Court Dissent

Justice Meyer, joined in dissent by Chief Justice Blatz, argued
that the majority was “plowing new ground in tort law by
221
The
recognizing a common law duty owed to foraging bees.”
dissent disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that landowners
213. Id. at 188-89.
214. Id. at 189.
215. Id. (citing Conover v. N. States Power, 313 N.W.2d 397 (Minn. 1981)).
The Conover court determined that an exception to the general rule that an owner
is not liable for a contractor’s actions exists if the owner retains detailed control
over a project and then fails to carefully supervise the contractor. Conover, 313
N.W.2d at 403.
216. Anderson, 693 N.W.2d at 189-90.
217. MINN. STAT. § 18B.07 (2004).
218. Id. § 18B.07, subd. 2(a)(1).
219. Anderson, 693 N.W.2d at 191.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 193 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
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have a duty to use their land in a way that does not injure the
222
property of others. The dissent suggested that the proper duty of
landowners is correctly stated as being a “duty not to create ‘a
serious interference with [neighbors’] use and enjoyment of land
223
by pollution or the like.’”
The dissent favored the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision
224
in Bennett v. Larsen, Co., which states that landowners owe no duty
to foraging bees on their property other than to avoid intentionally
225
or wantonly destroying the bees.
The dissent criticized the
majority’s reasoning that a common law duty exists based upon the
legislature’s enactment of protective statutes regarding pesticides
because it did not make sense for a common law duty to “spring[]
226
from a duty arising from state or federal regulation.”
Because a negligence per se claim arises from a statutory
violation as opposed to a common law violation, the dissent felt
that a remedy stemming from negligence per se was the more
227
appropriate route for the beekeepers.
Justice Meyer questioned
the ability of a jury to determine whether or not pesticide spraying
created an unreasonable risk without consulting a pesticide’s label
228
requirements.
Because the majority had concluded that the
beekeepers could sustain a claim for negligence per se, the dissent
concluded that it was unnecessary to allow a claim under ordinary
229
common law negligence.
VI. ANALYSIS OF THE ANDERSON DECISION
A. Honey Bees as Trespassers
Courts considering the issue of a pesticide user’s duty to
foraging bees often seem to have trouble with the classification of
bees as trespassers. The Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded in
Bennett that it is the “uninvited entry onto the property” which

222. Id. at 192.
223. Id. (citing DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 231 (2000)).
224. 348 N.W.2d 540 (Wis. 1984).
225. Anderson, 693 N.W.2d at 193 (Meyer, J., dissenting) (citing Bennett, 348
N.W.2d at 547 n.3).
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
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230

creates a trespass, and bees are not necessarily uninvited.
Similarly in Anderson, the Minnesota Supreme Court declined to
classify bees as trespassers because it would be “problematic to
characterize bees as unwelcome on land where trees and other
vegetation are grown for commercial purposes” due to their
231
beneficial effect upon such land.
A trespasser is defined as one who “intentionally and without
232
The question
consent or privilege enters another’s property.”
that arises upon analysis of the Anderson decision is whether honey
bees should fail to qualify as trespassers because they may provide a
benefit to the land upon which they forage.
Defining bees as trespassers is irreconcilable with the notion
that if one provides a benefit to the landowner, the person
providing the benefit cannot be classified as a trespasser. However,
the title of trespasser applies both to the “wicked and the
233
innocent.” It would indeed be problematic to define honey bees
as wicked per se given the benefits that they provide in
234
agriculture.
But Anderson must be distinguished from situations
in which a landowner has expressly consented or hired a
commercial beekeeper to provide bees for pollination. Simply
because honey bees may benefit owners of adjoining land does not
235
mean they are immune from the theory of trespass. In Anderson,
the honey bees were neither solicited nor invited onto the DNR or
IP property, and thus must be trespassers.
In fact, the Minnesota Supreme Court inadvertently classified
the honey bees as trespassers because it applied the traditional rule
236
relevant to trespassing livestock in Minnesota.
The Anderson
court declined to use the actual definition but still went on to base
its decision on the landowner’s duty of reasonable care “once he
230. Bennett, 348 N.W.2d at 547.
231. Anderson, 693 N.W.2d at 187 n.2.
232. BLACK’S, supra note 78, at 1543.
233. Id.
234. See discussion infra Parts III.A-B. regarding the various benefits conferred
upon the agricultural industry by honey bees.
235. The intent or motive behind an action is immaterial to a trespass claim.
87 C.J.S. Trespass § 6 (2005); see also Cover v. Phillips Pipe Line Co., 454 S.W.2d
507, 512 (Mo. 1970) (holding that an act may be done in good faith or with
honest intentions but still create liability for trespass in the actor); Brannon v. Gulf
States Energy Corp., 562 S.W.2d 219, 224 (Tex. 1977) (stating that one can be a
trespasser in good faith).
236. Anderson, 693 N.W.2d at 187 (citing Witherell v. Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry.
Co., 24 Minn. 410, 414 (1878)).
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237

knows . . . the trespasser’s presence.”
This reasoning will
undoubtedly create confusion in tort cases based upon trespassing
theory, much like the confusion the Minnesota Supreme Court
hoped to quash when abolishing the distinction between licensees
238
and invitees.
B. Common Law Negligence
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision provides landowners
using pesticides with a common law duty of reasonable care to
239
foraging bees that they know are on their property. The Anderson
court’s conclusion was based upon a landowner’s general duty not
240
to use land in a way that injures another’s property.
This is the
same reasonable use rule that has usually been applied in making
the determination that landowners are not liable for damage to bees
or other animals caused by pesticides sprayed on their own
241
property.
The Anderson court applied the reasonable use rule in
a way that is inconsistent with its previous application and
242
understanding by courts in other jurisdictions.
The question
remains as to whether this is a logical interpretation of the general
rule for the unique situation presented by foraging bees.
In its decision, the Anderson court cited the traditional
Minnesota rule that landowners have a limited duty to trespassing
243
livestock.
Under that rule, Minnesota landowners can only be
237. Id. (quoting DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 593 (2000)) (emphasis
added).
238. Peterson v. Balach, 294 Minn. 161, 164, 199 N.W.2d 639, 642 (1972).
Prior to the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in Peterson, liability towards
entrants on one’s land was determined according to whether the law regarded the
entrant as a licensee or an invitee. Id., 199 N.W.2d at 642. Because of the
confusion this created in the courts and for landowners, the court decided the
distinction should be abolished. Id. at 171, 199 N.W.2d at 646.
239. Anderson, 693 N.W.2d at 188-89.
240. Id. at 186.
241. See Ludington, supra note 121 (summarizing several cases from various
jurisdictions where a landowner was sued for the injury or death of livestock
caused by ingesting a poisonous substance while trespassing and was held as not
liable per the general rule that landowners are not bound to keep the premises
safe for trespassing animals of others).
242. See, e.g., Beinhorn v. Griswold, 69 P. 557 (Mont. 1902) (holding that a
mine operator had no affirmative duty to protect a neighboring landowner’s cattle
from ingesting poison while on his land); Tenn. Chem. Co. v. Henry, 85 S.W. 401
(Tenn. 1905) (holding that a landowner had no obligation to keep his premises
safe for trespassing animals).
243. Anderson, 693 N.W.2d at 187 (citing Witherell v. Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry.
Co., 24 Minn. 410, 414 (1878)).
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held liable for injuries to trespassing animals if they are proven to
244
Willful
be grossly negligent in their actions towards the animals.
negligence is proven by showing that after discovering the
trespassing animals, the landowner acted intentionally in such a
245
way as to injure them.
Because the Anderson court cites the above rules in its
reasoning, the court’s conclusion is not plausible. If the DNR and
IP had placed a poisonous substance on their land with the intent
to kill the honey bees foraging there, they could certainly be liable
for negligence under the Minnesota rule. However, they did not
have that intent. Instead, they sprayed pesticide on their land
246
solely in an effort to rid it of damaging pests.
For a plaintiff to succeed in a negligence claim, there must
also be proof that the negligent application of pesticides caused the
247
damage to animals or crops.
In Anderson, the plaintiffs offered
248
Thus, the
proof of causation for only the “Swanson incident.”
plaintiffs’ claims failed to satisfy the breach of duty and causation
requirements necessary to hold pesticide users liable under the
249
traditional reasonable use rule as applied in Minnesota.
There is a reason that the reasonable use rule has generally
been found to place liability upon pesticide users only in pesticide
drift cases. In those cases, it is easy to contemplate ways in which
reasonable landowners would act in order to avoid injuries to those
on neighboring land. For example, a reasonable landowner would
probably not spray pesticide when there is a strong wind blowing
250
towards the neighboring property.
However, in the unique
situation presented by foraging bees on the landowner’s property,
the rule is difficult to apply. This is at least partially due to the fact
244. Lindemann v. Chi., R.I. & P. Ry. Co., 154 Minn. 363, 365, 191 N.W. 825,
825-26 (1923).
245. See id., 191 N.W. at 825-26 (stating that men who were operating a train
and saw trespassing animals on the tracks with time to avoid them could be liable
based upon willful negligence for failing to avoid the animals).
246. Anderson, 693 N.W.2d at 185. The DNR and IP retained the pesticide
sprayer solely to combat a cottonwood leaf beetle infestation. Id.
247. See discussion infra Part IV.A (describing the essential elements of a
negligence claim).
248. Anderson, 693 N.W.2d at 185. See infra Part V.A for information related to
the “Swanson incident” and the MDA’s confirmation that Sevin caused the deaths
of the honey bees in that one incident.
249. See Witherell v. Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 24 Minn. 410, 414 (1878).
250. See Miles v. A. Arena & Co., 73 P.2d 1260 (Cal. 1937) (holding that
damage to neighboring property was foreseeable because a wind was blowing at
the time of the pesticide application).
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that there is no reasonable way for a landowner to prevent bees
from entering the land to forage for nectar, at least not for more
251
than short periods of time.
C. Negligence Per Se
The Anderson court, in making the determination that the
DNR and IP could be held liable for common law negligence,
relied heavily upon legislative efforts to address pesticide hazards
252
However, common law
through FIFRA labeling requirements.
actions in negligence stem from judicial decisions rather than
253
legislative efforts.
The violation of a statute that was created to
standardize pesticide usage through label regulations falls within
254
the principles of negligence per se, not common law negligence.
Negligence per se is often easier to establish because the
reasonable person standard of care is replaced by a fixed statutory
255
standard.
Minnesota enacted the MPCA to prohibit the use of
256
pesticides in a manner that is inconsistent with FIFRA labels. The
MPCA has thus created a statutory standard of care for pesticide
users in Minnesota by prescribing the way in which they are to use
pesticides, which is, in turn, regulated by federal statute under
FIFRA. The label on Sevin has a lengthy caution relating to the
257
Use of the pesticide in a
pesticide’s use near bee colonies.
manner inconsistent with that bee caution constitutes a violation of
the MPCA and creates a cause of action for negligence per se.
The Anderson court acknowledged the statutory standard of
care as a substitute for the reasonable person standard but failed to
explain why both causes of action should be upheld in this
258
situation.
The court made a point to recognize the legislative
intent behind FIFRA regulations when determining if a common

251. See Bennett v. Larsen Co., 348 N.W.2d 540, 547 n.2 (Wis. 1984).
252. Anderson, 693 N.W.2d at 188.
253. BLACK’S, supra note 78, at 293.
254. Id. at 1063; see also Lynghaug v. Payte, 247 Minn. 186, 193, 76 N.W.2d 660,
665 (1956) (holding that when the standard of conduct is prescribed by a statute,
that standard is a “legislative substitute for the common-law standard of a
reasonably prudent man”).
255. Elder v. Allstate Ins. Co., 341 F. Supp. 2d 1095, 1099 (D. Minn. 2004).
256. MINN. STAT. § 18B.07, subd. 2(a)(1) (2004).
257. Anderson v. State Dep’t of Natural Res., 674 N.W.2d 748, 751 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2004), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 693 N.W.2d 181.
258. Anderson, 693 N.W.2d at 189-90.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2006

31

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 4 [2006], Art. 5
10TRIPLETT.DOC

1520

5/31/2006 1:15:37 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:4

259

law duty of negligence was applicable; however, it failed to make
mention of such intent in the realm of negligence per se. Because
the Sevin label prescribes specific cautions regarding its use with
regard to honey bees, the resulting statutory standard of care
should supplant the reasonable person standard of care in order to
avoid confusion. If it does not, an applicator will not likely be able
260
to determine which standard he is expected to follow.
D. Public Policy
The Anderson court based much of its reasoning for the
creation of a common law duty to foraging bees on the policy of
protecting honey-producing operations as an important aspect of
261
The court stated that to hold that the DNR and IP
agriculture.
did not have a common law duty of reasonable care would be to
“carve out an exception of liability for damage to honey-producing
262
operations.”
However, is it not unfairly prejudicial to other
agricultural operations to allow commercial beekeepers to bring
both claims of negligence and negligence per se when negligence
per se alone would suffice? The court did not balance its decision
with the similar importance of using pesticides to increase and
263
improve crop production.
E. Implications to Pesticide Users and Beekeepers
The primary implication of the Anderson decision is that it sets
264
Future litigation regarding a
a binding precedent in Minnesota.
landowner’s duty to foraging bees on his own property will be
265
In
determined according to the reasoning set forth in Anderson.
259. Id. at 188.
260. See id. at 193 (Meyer, J., dissenting). The dissenting opinion in Anderson
presents a similar argument questioning how a jury would be able to determine
what type of pesticide use constitutes a violation of the reasonable person standard
without consulting the pesticide’s label requirements. Id.
261. Id. at 189-90.
262. Id. at 189 n.4. The court argued that “in referencing policy in support of
our determination [that the DNR and IP had a duty of reasonable care to the
foraging bees on their property], we are not recognizing a new common-law duty.”
Id.
263. See discussion supra Part II.A.
264. The doctrine of stare decisis requires Minnesota courts to adhere to
former decisions in order to provide more stability in the law. Oanes v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 617 N.W.2d 401, 406 (Minn. 2000) (citing Naftalin v. King, 257 Minn.
498, 509, 102 N.W.2d 301, 308 (1960)).
265. Under the theory of binding precedent, a lower court is obligated to
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addition, although they are not required to follow the Minnesota
Supreme Court’s decision, courts in other jurisdictions will likely
266
evaluate Anderson in applicable cases as persuasive precedent.
Anderson is particularly relevant to other jurisdictions because it is
one of only three decisions on the issue of liability to foraging bees
267
and is the most recent decision.
The Anderson precedent is troubling, considering the efforts
that have been put forth by the MDA and the EPA to address
268
pesticide hazards.
It essentially renders the MPCA and FIFRA
label requirements void because, if an applicator is required to
follow a reasonable person standard, there is no need for
269
cautionary labels.
Even the lead plaintiff in this case, Jeffrey
Anderson, did not feel that it was necessary for tort law to interfere
270
if the State would properly administer FIFRA regulations.
It is the Minnesota Supreme Court’s duty to determine
271
whether or not the lower court correctly applied the law.
The
common law to be applied here was that a landowner has a duty
only to avoid intentionally or wantonly harming honey bees
272
foraging on the property.
The statutory law to be applied is for
follow an applicable decision made by a higher court in its jurisdiction. BLACK’S,
supra note 78, at 1215.
266. Persuasive precedent is not binding on a court, but is usually entitled to
“respect and careful consideration” in similar cases. BLACK’S, supra note 78, at
1215.
267. Only California and Wisconsin have considered the exact situation
presented by Anderson. See Lenk v. Spezia, 213 P.2d 47 (Cal. Ct. App. 1949);
Bennett v. Larsen Co., 348 N.W.2d 540 (Wis. 1984).
268. See supra Parts II.B, III.D.
269. See Anderson v. State Dep’t of Natural Res., 693 N.W.2d 181, 188-89
(Minn. 2005) (holding that an applicator can be held to the reasonable person
standard under a claim for negligence).
270. Pesticide.Net, Applicators and Property Owners Liable if Pesticide Use Kills
Foraging Honey Bees, Court Rules,
INSIDER EJOURNAL, Mar. 15, 2005,
http://www.pestlaw.com/insider/articles/200503150205/05-BeeSuit.htm. Jeffrey
Anderson responded to the case with the following:
I feel we shouldn’t need tort law to protect us because we already have a
statute, FIFRA, if only the states would enforce it. The precautionary bee
statements lay it all out. If there are honey bees foraging you shouldn’t
be spraying, and, as long as everybody plays by that rule, we’re okay.
Id.
271. MINN. R. CIV. P. 56.03; see also State by Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 4
(Minn. 1990) (stating that on appeal, it is the court’s duty to determine whether
there are issues of material fact and whether the lower courts erred in their
application of the law).
272. See, e.g., Lenk, 213 P.2d 47; Bennett, 348 N.W.2d 540; see also 3B C.J.S.
Animals § 426 (2004).
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the DNR and IP to apply the pesticides according to the Sevin
273
It is not appropriate for the court to create a standard of
label.
care that may be inconsistent with the standard prescribed by the
legislature.
How easy will it be for beekeepers to recover damages? They
must be able to prove that the landowner had actual or
274
constructive knowledge of foraging bees on the property.
The
Anderson court held that state apiary registration is not enough to
275
put pesticide users on notice.
The beekeepers must then prove
that pesticide was carelessly sprayed and that the bees died as a
276
result of the pesticide. This could also be difficult given the track
277
record of previous MDA complaints.
It would be easier to apply
the standard set forth by FIFRA and the MPCA rather than trying
to determine the reasonable person standard.
VII. CONCLUSION
A negligence per se action in the Anderson case would have
sufficed to bring all the parties’ issues to light and allow the lower
court to rule properly without the discrepancies between standards.
The supreme court’s decision will create confusion among
pesticide users and anyone encountering the trespass doctrine
under tort law. The real problem stems from the improper
administration of policies set forth in FIFRA to specifically protect
parties such as the plaintiffs in Anderson. By ruling that a common
law action in negligence exists, the supreme court has reiterated
the notion that the statutory duties are not being properly
enforced. Ignoring the intent of the legislature to balance the
interests of beekeepers and pesticide users in agriculture through
FIFRA, the supreme court has set the scales in favor of one party’s
contributions to agriculture. By allowing a beekeeper to maintain a
common law action for negligence, the Minnesota Supreme Court
has incorrectly expanded the traditional duties of a land possessor
towards trespassers.

273.
274.
275.
276.
277.

See MINN. STAT. § 18B.07 (2004).
Anderson, 693 N.W.2d at 187.
Id.
See discussion supra Part IV.A.
See discussion supra Part III.D.
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